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Japan, Rice, and Super 301
by Randall Allen
Japan IS an Important Amencan partner In both secunty Issues and economIc-trade Issues.
But closed Japanese markets, especially in rice, are a bone of contention between the two
countries. America's "Super 301" could be used to pressure Japan towards more open
markets, but that pressure could potentially sour U.S.-Japanese relations. The potential costs
and benefits of using Super 301 to force a more open rice market are assessed both in terms
of the economic and trade implications and in terms of the potential security implications.
The effects of Super 301 on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) negotiations is also assessed. Finally, the overall effects are examined in an effort to develop a
policy recommendation.

Thesis
Super 301 could produce positive net
effects with regard to forces for change in
Japan. Its enactment would most likely
lead to U.S. penetration of the rice market.
However, Super 301 would damage
U.S. leadership capabilities in GAIT and
represents an undemocratic approach to
international conflict resolution.
Comparative studies of 1988 Super 301
and GAIT market-opening efforts suggest
that Super 301 would not be any more
effective than GAIT, which has already
taken up the issue of liberalizing Japan's
rice market. Thus, even if Super 301 's
unique net benefits in terms of effects on
forces for change within Japan were
judged to rival the damaging costs to U.S.
overall democratic-international leadership
capability, enactment of Super 301 would
be unnecessary. That is to say, with
comparative results in terms of exports
being basically equivalent, the broader
objectives of strengthening and sustaining
the United States' leadership of global
democratic efforts such as GAIT should
take priority over the possibility of affecting rice-related forces internal to Japan. It

is arguable, however, that at least the
current threat of a rice-targeted Super 301
has prompted Japan's willingness to support the rice-liberalization negotiations in
GAIT. Thus, this threat should be maintained, for example through the activity of
pro-Super-301 elements within Congress.

I. Comments on Methodology
This analysis attempts to produce a
policy recommendation with regard to
United States international trade, ideology,
and security interests. It does not examine
why Super 301 is enacted, in terms of
various political forces internal to America.
The data upon which much of the
discussion rests is subject to some error,
both in the way it is presented and the way
in which it is used. No fundamental arguments in this essay, however, rest on fineline distinctions in quantitative data, but
rather on general trends, ensuring that the
logic of the essay can withstand possible
margins of error in data measurement or
interpretation.
Although the author began his research
with a personal political viewpoint
basically in opposition to Super 301, every
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effort was made to provide fair analysis
The sheer magnitude of Japan-U.S.
and conclusions.
trade alone would establish a sufficient
The secondary issue of ideology, which
backdrop to elevate discussion of Super
involves the discussion of
democracy, is certainly
Table 1. JapanlU.S. Trading Partners, 1989, in U.S. $ billions.
value-laden; the assumption
is that democracy is
Export -to: Japan/U.S.
Gennany
UK
France
Italy
F.S.U.
inherently good and worth
-from
supporting not only within
U.S.A.
45
17
21
7
5
12
the United States but as much
Japan
94
15
5
3
11
4
as possible in the context of
international relationships as
Source: Adapted from Farnsworth 1992,31.
well. This assumption will
be shaped and defined at the
appropriate point in the
paper. It ought to be frankly stated from
301 to a place of keen interest, but the
grave problems within the overall trade
the onset, however, that although the
relationship serve to further intensify the
assumption is debatable--even to the point
setting. The primary difficulty facing the
of providing an excellent topic for future
research--it is accepted prima facie in this
relationship is the trade imbalance, as
shown in Table 2.
paper and forms an important part of the
The causes of the trade deficit are
thesis.
several: macroeconomic factors such as
ll. Background, Framing the Issue
imbalanced interest rates and capital flows,
manufacturing quality and marketing techniques,
and internal and external barriers
The Importance of Japan, Primary Issue:
to trade. The importance of Super 301
Economics/Trade
Japan has the world's third largest
economy, behind the United States and the
former Soviet Union, with a Gross National Product of two trillion eight hundred
and ninety billion dollars (Farnsworth
1992, 11). Apart from Canada, Japan and
the United States are each other's greatest
single-nation trading partners. Table 1
compares U.S.-Japan trade and trade with
some other nations. (Farnsworth 1992,
31).
Japan is the largest market for U.S.
agricultural exports, taking in over eight
billion dollars value in 1990, with the next
country in line, Canada, only importing
half as much, approximately four billion
dollars (CRS 1992b, 1).

Table 2. Japan-U.S. Balance of Trade, 1982-92 (in
$ billions U.S.)
Year

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

1990
1991
1992·

Exports
20.7
21.6
23.2
22.2
26.6
27.8
37.4
44.5
48.6
48.1
16.0

·January - April
Source: Cooper 1992, 1.

~

37.7
41.2
57.1
68.8
81.9
84.6
89.8
93.5
89.7
91.6
31.0

Balance
-17.1
-19.6
-34.0
-46.6
-55.3
-56.8
-52.4
-49.0
-41.1
-43.4
-15.0

29 Pi Sigma Alpha Review

rests in part in its potential to bring about
a reduction in the trade imbalance through
eliminating external barriers to trade, such
as Japan's rice-import ban.
Certainly, the economic level of interdependence as well as the difficulties of
the relationship reflected in the summary
figures above serve to define Super 301 as
a policy option dealing with high stakes
and thus calling for careful and judicious
analysis.
The Importance of Japan, Secondary Issue:
HistoryIIdeology
Japan has particular importance to the
United States as a nation whose basic
governmental and economic structure was
put into place by U.S. occupational leadership after World War II. As such, it
represents an experiment in the viability of
American Constitutional ideals, as well in
the adaptability of those ideals to forms of
culture and society drastically different
from those found in North America. It is
interesting to note the difficult struggles
erupting in several Eastern European
nations as each attempts to adopt democratic and capitalist ideals similar to those
traditionally upheld and proclaimed by the
United States. Certainly the U.S. has an
interest in the successful adoption and
establishment of such ideals globally.
Although Japan is unique in many ways
and thus not a completely universalizable
model of transition from centralized power
to freedom and democracy, it serves as
one example of a very successful transition, as guided and aided by the United
States.
Here, as with the trade issue discussed
earlier, it becomes clear that the continued
alliance and successful interaction between
the United States and Japan is of great
importance; thus, careful consideration of
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Super 301 as a dynamic policy option
becomes an exciting and critical task.
The Importance of Japan, Secondary Issue:
Security
Japan is a vital ally for the U.S. in the
Far East; the health of Japan-U.S. relationships is a key factor in maintaining
stability throughout the Pacific Rim.
While Japanese invasions of China and
Korea during World War II still leave
trailing elements of distrust, Japan's neighbors have slowly opened productive diplomatic and trade relations with their former
aggressor, assured by the commitment to
non-militarism established by Japan's
Constitution and supported by the extensive system of surrogate defense forces
placed on strategic Japanese soil by the
United States, based upon the Mutual
Security Treaty for Strategic Protection
signed in 1955 (CRS 1992a, 1).
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the
long-standing alliance lost one of its initial
purposes for existing as well as a dynamic
unifying threat throughout the Cold War
period. While Japan and the U.S. have
traveled almost far enough as global partners to forget the enmity and military
monstrosities they exchanged during World
War II, the absence of Soviet threat coupled with a general decline in bilateral
economic relations, as epitomized in the
United States' festering trade deficit,
threatens to endanger the productive and
useful security alliance.
An interesting 1990 Business Week poll
found that 68 percent of Americans
consider the Japanese economic threat to
U.S. interests greater than any military
threat from the former republics of the
Soviet Union. A different poll conducted
by the New York Times in 1989 found that
almost half of Japanese citizens believed
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that if Japan were attacked, the United
States would not help militarily (JEI 1990,
4). This polling data clearly reflect the
existence of animosity and doubt within
the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Likewise, the symptoms of recent
breakdown in the overall Japan-U.S.
relationship clearly appear in the polling
Table 3. Poll: Japan-U.S. relations.
How would you describe relations between Japan and the United
States today?

Very Friendly
Somewhat Friendly
Somewhat
Unfriendly
Very Unfriendly

23%
65

17 %
62

5 %
68

11%
57

6

10
2

20

25
4

No Answer

5

9

6

3

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,3-4.

data in the form of general decline over
time in positive impressions held by
Japanese and U.S. citizens toward each
other. One New York Times poll found a
discouraging trend (with one exception in
the Japanese "Very Friendly" category)
between 1985 and 1989, as reflected in
responses to the question in Table 3.
It is clear that although Japan and the
United States depend on each other as
economic, historical/ideological, and security partners, growing ill-will--in part, no
doubt, from tension over trade--threatens
to weaken the relationship. The following
analysis of Super 301 must take into account this reality.

Basic Description of Super 301
Super 301 is an amended form of
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
which originally authorized the President,
through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to investigate unfair foreign
trade practices and increase duties or other
restrictions in retaliation when deemed
appropriate. Super 301 has only been
enacted once, as part of the 1988 Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act. It represented Congress' reaction against what was
perceived to be the too feeble and too
infrequent employment of Section 301
action by the executive branch. It mandated that the USTR annually list priority
unfair trading partners with their respective unfair trading practices. After announcing this list, the USTR was given a
12 or 18 month deadline, depending on the
type of practice, by which it had to either
acquire sufficient concessions at the negotiating table or recommend appropriate
retaliatory actions (Nanto 1991, 1-2). The
1988 Super 301 expired after two years of
implementation in 1989 and 1990. The
dominant proposal in the 102nd Congress
to re-enact Super 301, House Resolution
5100, vied to bypass the discretionary listmaking powers of the USTR in posing
mandates to specifically investigate several
nations' trade restrictions, including Japan's import ban on rice. Although H.R.
5100 failed to pass, its Democratic sponsors are expected to push similar Super
301 legislation to the decision-making
agenda in the 103rd Congress.
Super 301 is perceived generally as a
hard-hitting, decisive means of prying
open unfairly restricted foreign markets for
increased U.S. exports. This perception
stems from the condemnatory tone of the
unfair trading partner/practice list, the
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affixing of strict deadlines, and the threat
of retaliation.

sovereignty through conserving traditional
domestic production of rice (CRS 1992b,
1).

Japan and Rice: The History and Reasons
Behind the Rice Import Ban
Following World War II, Japan faced a
severe food shortage caused by forced
repatriation of Japanese nationals formerly
living outside Japan and by the collapse of
Japan's productive colonial ties throughout
the Pacific Rim. Food consumption
dropped below 1400 calories through
1950. The United States instituted land
reform, creating a small-plot farming
system with rice as the primary crop and
dietary staple. This system remains largely intact today, with part-time rice farmers
managing a meager 2.5 acres on the average. In order to protect this small-time
farming operation as a guarantee of at least
basic food security and to avoid any repeat
of the terrible post-war years of hunger
and dependence upon foreign food aid,
Japan closed its borders to any importation
of foreign rice. Though producing a highquality rice, the Japanese rice industry
passes on a consumer price of five to six
times the current world price of rice due to
the import-ban (USDA 1992, 5).
Protecting domestic rice production is
not only a reflection of food-security concerns, but also of Japanese culture. Rice
plays a central role in many Japanese
religious festivals and ceremonies, including the daily offering of bowls of rice to
deceased ancestors at family in-house'
shrines known as butsudan. Many Japanese city-dwellers maintain strong ties to
original family homes in rural areas supported in part by the income transfers
caused by the protection of the small-scale
rice farming industry. The rice-import
ban reflects a desire to maintain cultural

Japan and Rice: Forces Against Change
Both the concern for basic food security and the desire to protect home-production of one of Japan's principal cultural
items, as described above, work as strong
forces against revoking the rice-import
ban. Other forces against change exist in
addition to these two.

The Political Power of Agriculture
Despite a drastically lower level of
overall agricultural output, Japan has twice
as many farmers as the United States, 85
percent of whom are part-time farmers of
small home fields (USDA 1990, 3). The
sheer number of farmers, as well as the
cultural and historical significance of their
product, has created an entrenched
political interest group which holds tightly
to the strings of the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), which has commanded a
majority in the Japanese Congress or
"Diet" for the last 35 years. Additionally,
the Ministry of Agriculture is vehemently
opposed to trade liberalization, as it serves
a basic constituency which is
internationally non-competitive. Pressure
from the ministry, coupled with longstanding financial and voting support of
the LDP by the agricultural community
have proven to set Japan's rice ban up as a
firm and lasting symbol of resistance to
change (Aheam 1989, 24). To appease
the agriculture lobby, the Diet has adopted
several resolutions expressing opposition to
rice liberalization (Asahi 1992, 3). The
defeat of a pro-rice-market liberalization
LDP candidate by a somewhat obscure
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opposition party candidate this year was
precipitated by a backlash against the LDP
candidate in nine out of ten rice-producing
counties. Hiromu Nonaka, chief of the
LDP election bureau observed, "[The]
major factor responsible for the defeat of
the LDP ... candidate in the ... election
was the rice issue" (2).
It is very difficult for pro-trade liberalization politicians and bureaucrats in Japan
to formulate a strong enough coalition to
overcome the agricultural interest's hold
over such status quo protectionist policies
as the rice ban. When Keidanren, the
largest big business advocacy group in
Japan, openly opposed protectionist agricultural policy in 1984, a grass-roots
movement mobilized to boycott all products produced by companies affiliated with
Keidanren, promptly producing a formal
apology and a recanting of the suspect
criticism (Ahearn 1989, 56-7).
The Power of the Status Quo
A final broad force against rice liberalization is the inherent Japanese societal
esteem for the status quo. A May 1990
poll conducted by the Japanese Prime
Minister's office found that approximately
90 percent of Japanese households consider
themselves "middle-class" (Farnsworth
1992, 86). Raymond Ahearn, a specialist
in trade relations at the U.S. Library of
Congress, observes, "[t]his has been interpreted to mean that the vast majority of
Japanese have achieved a measure of
material well-being and are basically satisfied with the way they live" (Ahearn 1989,
57).
This contentment translates into a force
against economic change and the feared
upheaval of rural communities economically tied to the import ban.
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Japan and Rice: Forces for Change
Food Security and Trade
Despite resistance, several forces for
liberalization of the rice market exist. To
begin, with regard to the food-security
justification for the rice ban, it is notable
that rice consumption has fallen by onethird since 1960, while other dietary elements such as meat, eggs, and dairy, have
tripled and quintupled (See Table 4.)
As Japanese citizens substitute foods
such as beef and bread as significant elements in their basic food plan, rice loses
ground as the mainstay of the Japanese
diet and, thus, the main source of basic
nutrition and food-security.
Additionally, Japan runs an approximate annual trade deficit of 30 billion
dollars in basic foodstuffs (Farnsworth
1992, 33). Coupled with dietary shifts
explained above, this serves to deflate the
arguments in favor of the protection of
rice as a food-security guarantee, in that
true food security is becoming increasingly
dependent upon diverse food products and
thus reliant on secure and healthy trade
relations, which the ban works against.
This translates into a force in favor of
flexibility and cooperation with important
agricultural trading partners like the
United States.
Table 4. Japanese dietary characteristics
(kg/yr).

Meat
Eggs
Dairy
Fish
Rice
Wheat

1960

1985

5
5
22
28
117
26

25
15
67
36
75
32

Source: USDA 1990, 9.
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The "Me" Generation
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The question of removing Japan's riceimport ban in order to improve trade
relations with the U. S., however, summons criticism but shows a smaller differential between basic supportive and oppositional opinions toward protection (Table
7) than Table 6 shows in dealing with
agricultural in general.
This data suggests that removal of the rice
ban, although not supported outright by
dominant public opinion, finds noteworthy
support and a less daunting level of resistance than with agricultural market liberalization broadly speaking.

The cultural underpinnings of rice
protection are challenged by rising consumerism, or the "Me" generation. The
post-World War II generation has known
less of hardship or sacrifice, and is bent on
consuming as much as possible, regardless
of whether a good is domestically
produced or imported. It feels less loyalty
to traditions of domestic production of
goods such as rice, and is not easily
reconciled to the enormous costs of
Japan's rice policy (Ahearn 1989, 46).
The average yearly transfers to rice farmers paid by consumers through higher
Table 5. Poll: Japan, u.s. attitudes toward protectionrice prices was estimated in 1986 at
ism in general.
approximately 2,621 billion yen, or
roughl y 14 billion dollars according to
As a measure for protecting [Japanese! American) industry, there
the exchange rate at that time (USDA
are such ways as to impose a high tariff or a surcharge on
1990, 23). High yen rates have also had
imported goods, or restrict imports in quantity. Do you think
a significant impact on the general
that these measures are to be taken as a matter of course, or do
you think that [Japan! America) ought not to do so? (Japanese
attractiveness of imported goods, adding
were asked about Japan's trade policies; Americans were asked
to the overall consumer leanings toward
about U.S. trade policies.)
support of trade liberalization (Ahearn
U.S.
Japan
1989, 61).
Measures ought to be taken
Public Opinion

Polling data reveal the existence of a
significant though not majority level of
Japanese public sentiment against protectionist trade barriers in general.
Although relatively equivalent proprotection sentiment exists, the polls
reflect a slightly greater orientation toward
free trade among Japanese than among
Americans (Table 5), supporting the
hypothesis that Japanese public opinion
will tend to be a force for change in the
future.
Among Japanese, protection of the
agriculture industry, however, seems to
enjoy considerably stronger support than
protectionism in general (Table 6).

as a matter of course

43.2 %

66.1 %

Ought not to do so

40.5

23.2

Other
No Answer

2.5
13.8

1.1
9.7

The Strong Yen

An additional force for change exists in
the strong value of the yen. Beginning in
1985, the value of the yen increased drastically, nearly doubling in three years. This
led to relative drop in the price of imports
generally, followed by a corresponding
boom in demand. This has contributed to
rising consumer consciousness and changing consumer tastes, with a general movement toward greater levels of awareness,
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acceptance, and preference of foreign
goods (Ahearn 1989, 30, 61).
Table 6. Poll: Japanese attitudes toward protection of agriculture.
About "importing agricultural products, • there are
two opinions. A: 'It will be better to go on
importing inexpensive agricultural products.' B: 'In
order to protect the country's domestic agriculture,
it is a matter of course to restrict imports.' Which
opinion is closer to your view (1989)?
Closer to opinion A
Closer to opinion B
Other
No Answer

32.4 %
59.4
2.0
6.1

Source: Adapted from JE11990, 8.

Table 7. Poll: Japanese attitudes toward
removing the rice import ban.
Now, do you favor or oppose the Japanese
government taking any of these measures to
improve relations with America?
Removing
the ban
on imports

Favor Oppose Not Sure
39 % 48 %
13 %

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,8.

Views and Decisions of Some Japanese
Political Leaders

Some political momentum for change
has been created in recent statements of
prominent Japanese political figures. In
January of 1992, for example, Kiichi
Miyazawa, Japan's prime minister at the
time, argued publicly that rice imports
would not damage the agricultural incomes
significantly. Also, Michio Watanabe,
Japan's Foreign Minister, argued in favor
of rice market liberalization. Additionally,
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factional heads of the LDP reportedly
entered into an informal agreement to
support rice liberalization. However, due
to the constant threat of backlash from the
agriculture lobby, such statements of support have been followed by equivocation
(Asahi 1992, 3).
In April of this year, for the first time
ever, the Japanese government allowed the
U.S. Department of Agriculture to include
rice in an annual food fair exhibition in
Tokyo. Just one year ago at the same
event, U. S. officials were forced to remove U.S. rice from the exhibit at the
threat of arrest. This change seems to
reflect a weakening in the severity of
traditional government opposition to the
possibility of foreign rice importation
(Tokyo Kyodo 1992).

m.

CostlBenefit Analysis of Super 301

Vis-A-Vis Effects on Forces ForI Against
Change
Super 301 and Forces for Change

Because of its confrontational tone,
Super 301 is a very dramatic and highly
publicized policy movement. A rice-targeted Super 301 would affect and increase
in the volume of Japan's public debate
about the rice issue in general. To the
extent that such public debate were to
include accurate reflections of the overall
food security situation, including figures
on Japan's heavy dependence on U.S.
imports of various basic foodstuffs, and
increase in concern for healthy and peaceable agricultural trade relations could
increase pressure to appease the U. S. and
allow rice importation. To the extent that
such public debate were to stress the extremely high comparative price Japanese
consumers pay for rice because of the
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import ban, the "Me" generation could
respond with additional pressure to open
the border to imports in hopes that despite
likely high tariffs, prices would eventually
decrease.
It is possible that the threat of retaliation implicit in Super 301 could play into
the hands of LDP leaders who favor elimination of the ban. The political damage
inherent in offending the agriculture lobby
if trade concessions were extended to the
Table 8. Poll: Japan-U.S. relations, 1985 and
1989.
How would you describe relations between Japan
and the United States today?
U.S.
1985 1989
14 % 17 %

Japan
1985 1989
2 %
II %

Somewhat
Friendly

59

62

52

57

Somewhat
Unfriendly

14

10

40

25

Very
Unfriendly

3

2

3

4

No Answer

10

9

3

3

Very Friendly

Source: Adapted from JEI 1990,3-4.

United States could be lessened if the press
were to emphasize the costs to national
prosperity that could be incurred if Super
301 demands were unappeased and punitive measures such as increased trade
restrictions on Japanese exports followed.
Each of the above scenarios is speculative and, thus, less than ideal grounding
for a supportive recommendation of Super
301. However, a closer look at two conditions in Japan suggests that the scenarios
may be less specUlative than they originallyappear. First, key elements within the

LDP have expressed qualified support of
rice-market liberalization, as described
earlier. Second, the Japanese press is
highly influenced and monitored by government leadership. Newsworthy events
are funnelled to the press through exclusive reporter clubs organized and maintained within each government entity or
agency (Gibney 1985, 244). Powerful
government officials in favor of liberalization could use the leverage inherent in this
governmental press club structure to disseminate information helpful to their
cause.
However, the unilateral, bully-like
approach of Super 301 could damage
Japanese public sentiment toward the U.S.,
inciting a Japanese nationalist backlash
strong enough to eclipse the above forces
for change. As Table 3 indicates, goodwill between the United States and Japan
has been declining. Table 3, however,
shows only the first and last years of a
five-year annual survey; good-will actually
showed an increase between 1988 and
1989 (Table 8), suggesting that the 1988
Super 301 at least did not cause immediate
harm to public opinion; it could have even
had a positive effect, although the reasoning behind response data is not indicated,
so any link to Super 301 one way or another is less than sure.
The only force for change yet to be
discussed, the strength of the yen, does not
lend itself to this analysis of the positive
and negative effects of Super 301. The
impact on exchange rates and thus on
import prices would most likely be ambiguous, depending on numerous variables
beyond the scope of this research.

Super 301 and Forces Against Change
As describe above, Super 301-induced
media discussion of the rice-import ban
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could heighten the realization of Japan's
import dependence on the United States for
significant levels of basic food-stuffs; this
could weaken the long-standing resistance
to change based on increasingly outdated
conceptions of food security based on rice
alone, as described earlier.
On the other hand, despite shifting
dietary patterns, rice remains a central
player in the food security tradition of
post-World War II Japan and is perhaps
inseparably linked with the poignant memory of Japan's struggle to overcome postWorld War II helplessness. Rice, with its
peculiar historical role, coupled with its
cultural and religious significance, may
provide for a different, more defensive
public response as a Super 301 target than
did the 1988 Super 301 's targets: supercomputers, satellites, and wood products.
However, the polling data seem to indicate
a decrease in the likelihood of such a
special case. As described earlier, the
comparison of Table 6 and Table 7 reveal
a slightly smaller differential between
support and opposition of protection with
regard to rice than with regard to agriculture in general; thus, rice, despite its
historical and cultural distinction, does not
seem to enjoy special public deference
when it comes to the import-ban policy.
The political power of agriculture is
likely to oppose trade liberalization regardless of the way in which it is brought to
the decision-making agenda. As described
earlier, even when the largest indigenous
business advocacy group in Japan sought
to wield its power against agricultural
protectionism, grass-roots lobbying crippled the effort and brought Keidanren to
its knees. The unbending resolve of entrenched agricultural interests will not
respond positively to proposals to weaken
protection regardless of location or struc-
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ture of the source, foreign or domestic,
Super 301 or GATT negotiations.
The only force against change yet to be
discussed, the power of the status quo--as
defined and developed in this paper, would
likely see only negligible effects due to the
introduction of Super 301; for it to be
otherwise, a significant number of Japanese would have to be affected by the
Super 301 effort adversely enough to
change their basic perceptions of their own
socio-economic status. Such perception
shifts are possible in the long-run if Super
301 were to induce rice-market liberalization and cause some economic adjustments
in rural communities (although it should be
remembered that on the average, 85 percent of farming households' income comes
from non-farm sources; thus, the effects of
lower rice prices due to replacing the ban
with tariffs and allowing some imports,
could arguably be modest). To restate,
after-effects of actual policy changes could
cause some shifts in the support of the
status quo, due to perceptions of relative
economic well-being, but the direct impact
of Super 301 initiation on the same would
be ambiguous. Even if there were to be a
certain long-term socio-economic perception shift as hypothesized, it would be
difficult to predict how that shift would
pan out with respect to public policy; for
example, if farming households were hurt
significantly enough, change in the direction of returning to heavy agricultural
protection may be sought. Alternatively,
shifts in the economy may produce a more
general weakening of the Japanese resistance to change in any form, thus opening
the door wider to debate on various market
reforms.
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Costs/Benefits Vis-A-Vis Secondary Issues
Super 301 and History/Ideology
The ensuing discussion rests on the
following assumption: democratic principles can apply in similar ways to the governing relationships between nations as it
can to the governing relationships within
nations. The position of this paper is that
to some extent, this assumption is true.
There is considerable support of such in
the establishment and activity of such
governing systems as the United Nations
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, both of which were founded and
are sustained through the significant involvement of the United States.
Because of unique post-World War II
interaction, the United States and Japan
together exemplify the expansion, adaptation, and success of democracy. The
fundamental principle of democracy could
be defined as follows: Equal standing,
consent, and panicipation of the basic
entities governed, both in the original
structuring of rules and in the ongoing
decision-making processes. If Super 301
creates a situation which contradicts this, it
represents in some ways a departure from
democratic ideals. The cost of such a
departure would be difficult to quantify.
At this crucial time in global history,
however, when numerous new nations are
experiencing bitter struggles on their individual roads toward democratic reform, an
example of steadiness and strength from
Japan and the United States, the world's
most prominent leaders, in their commitment to the fundamentals of democratic
conflict resolution even in the face of
difficult economic tensions, would be of
great value.
Inasmuch as the goal of Super 301 is
aimed at creating equal standing and par-
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ticipation in the economic relationship, it
could be said that its end is the perpetuation of the fundamental democratic principles as defined. However, the means of
Super 301 represent a stark departure
therefrom. First of all, the rules of the
game, involving definitions of unfair trading practices and the deadlines for concessions are made strictly unilaterally, by the
United States. Although the definitions
may arguably be accurately assigned and
the deadlines fairly chosen, Super 301 is
undemocratic in that the basic structure of
the negotiation process is not formulated
with equal standing and consent of one of
the basic entities to be governed thereby:
Japan. The United States has the ability
and liberty as a sovereign nation to make
such demands on Japan, but those demands
are not democratic in nature and thus
represent a possible ideological shift of
sorts. If Japan were to refuse to engage in
more democratic negotiation, such a unilaterally directed course of action would be
more justifiable. However, several existing avenues for more democratic negotiation are welcomed and fully participated in
by the Japanese, including the Strategic
Impediments Initiative and GATT.
The failure of these forums of debate
to adequately or fairly address the rice
issue would likewise provide greater justification for the United States to vie for the
unilateral approach of Super 301. However, rice is currently a primary subject of
negotiation in the Uruguay Round of
GATT. The Dunkel proposal, which was
agreed upon by the nations of GATT in
January as the working basis for final
rounds of negotiation, includes a proposal
for the elimination of Japan's rice-import
ban, the very goal of Super 301 (Hanrahan
1992, 10).
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Super 301 and Security
It is difficult to assess the impact of
Super 301 on the important security relationship shared by the United States and
Japan. This paper will only touch briefly
one possible Super 30 I-security link provided by public opinion, with the following assumption: Healthy security relations
are supported by positive public opinion
reciprocated between the nations in the
security relationship.
As discussed earlier, there has been a
steady decline in optimism regarding U. S.Japan relations. If Super 301 were to
open markets such that U.S. exports increased significantly enough to ease the
trade imbalance and, thus, the overall
tension of the economic relationship, the
indirect impact on the security relationship
through improved public opinion would be
positive.
As described earlier, public opinion
showed general improvement between
1988 and 1989. It appears, then, that
Super 301 at least did not have any significant negative impact on public opinion.
Although the importance of Japan with
regard to stability in the Pacific Rim and
the maintenance of U.S. bases on strategic
Japanese territory is great enough to warrant the examination of the possible impact
of Super 301 on security, public opinion
provides only an indirect impact assessment. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to
state that the data seem to vindicate Super
301 of at least the potential cost of negatively impacting public opinion significantly enough to cause any decline in the
health of the security relationship.
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Costs/Benefits Vis-A-Vis the Primary
Issue: Economics/Trade

Super 301 Effects on U. S. Expons and the
Trade Imbalance
Estimates of possible sales of U.S. rice
in Japan if Super 301 were to succeed in
pressuring Japan to lift its import ban run
as high as 656 million dollars (Cooper
1992, 3).
It is possible, however, that other
countries, especially countries like Thailand who produce a type of rice very
similar to Japanese rice, could seize a
significant portion of a newly opened
market. Also, U.S. exports across the
board could suffer slightly if Super 301
action, which might not deal only with
rice, but with other sectors such as automobiles as well, served to reinforce a
general perception among Japanese consumer that only through hard-line government pressure can U.S. goods be moved in
Japan, that U.S. goods seem incapable of
selling themselves based simply on qUality.
Dick Nanto, a Specialist in Industry and
Trade at the U.S. Library of Congress
sees evidence of this perception in the
comparative success of U. S. auto sales. In
1990, for example, the U.S. Big Three
sold 15,975 autos, the British 19,653, and
the Germans 127,442 (Nan to 1991, 23).
With respect to rice specifically, however,
U.S. government action to overturn Japan's complete ban and allow the introduction of U.S. rice into the market would be
less likely to reinforce such consumer
doubts of quality. Thus, it would be a
mistake to assign Super 301 with respect
to rice (the focus of this paper) costs of
this kind.
Additional costs, however, to U.S.
exports could be incurred were Super 301
on rice to fail to produce concession and
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thus follow its own designated coarse to
retaliatory trade restrictions which could
lead to an international trade war, and thus
to decreased u.S. exports. In the case of
1988's Super 301, however, no such retaliatory actions were taken in the case of
India, which along with Japan, had been
targeted, but who unlike Japan, refused to
produce concessions. The USTR simply
refused to recommend sanctions. Although
a repeat of this balk would serve to create
an image of Super 301 as an idle threat, it
is important to note that precedent provides the USTR with considerable discretion, such that a trade war resulting from
unappeased Super 301 action is not unavoidable.
A final question of costs involves
Super 301 's focus on obvious, external
barriers to trade. While a large portion of
the problems faced by U. S. exports to
Japan lie with direct and indirect internal
barriers to trade such as Japan's distribution system, land-prices, anti-trust laws,
and savings rates, Super 301 would serve
to shift the focus away from these key
items. However, the heated interchange
between u.S. and Japanese trade officials
which immediately resulted from 1988
passage of Super 301 spawned the Structural Impediments Initiative, a bilateral
negotiation forum whose purpose was to
focus on these very internal barriers.
Therefore, Super 301' s potential costs in
this area ought rather to be expressed as
potential indirect benefits (Ahearn 1990,
29).
Even if Super 301 is successful in
creating the estimated 656 million in U.S.
rice exports, that would only amount to a
1 percent reduction of the overall U.S.
trade deficit. Accordingly, Super 301
should not be viewed as a means to
decisively tum-around the troubled JapanU.S. economic relationship. Nevertheless,
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the incremental effect would be a positive
step, and the increased sales would provide
specific benefits to the rice-growing industry in the United States.
Comparative Analysis: 1988 Super 301 v.
GAIT Agreement

The ability of Super 301 to produce
Japanese market access in specifically
targeted areas can be analyzed by comparing the corresponding ability of an alternative method of negotiation. Such an alternative model was provided in the same
year as the enactment of the original Super
301, 1988, when the GATT-ll Agreement
was secured. Super 301 centered on three
U.S. export sectors deemed to be unfairly
inhibited in Japan: supercomputers, wood
products, and satellites. GATT-II dealt
with eleven agricultural products.
Both the Super 301 and the GATT
processes have produced some positive
results. A cross-analysis of quantitative
data is difficult for two reasons, however.
First, although Super 301 was enacted in
1988, it produced only agreements to
negotiate at the time, rather than actual
trade agreements as with GATT (which
had been debated for two years previous to
the agreement) (Nanto 1992, 14). The
Super 301-spawned negotiation process
then took two to four years until specific
settlements in each sector were signed.
Not enough time has passed to know the
actual quantitative effects of those settlements. Second, because the Super 301
and GATT agreements dealt with different
economic sectors, comparing results even
when enough time passes will be a difficult
task, since numerous variables affect different economic sectors in unique ways.
For example, ketchup imports may show a
greater increase than satellites, yet the
reason for this may not be the comparative
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effectiveness of the different negotiation
forums but rather the impact of direct
national security concerns on the satellite
market, wherein the Japanese government
must protect viable domestic production
capabilities. Even more fundamentally,
export quantities are not affected only by
trade agreements, but by overall fluctuations in the international market, including
changing exchange rates and levels of
supply and demand.
It can be demonstrated, however, at
least, that both methods of trade negotiation seemed to have produced some positive results. At the same time, neither
seemed to have produced all of its goals
fully. GAIT-11 directed the removal of
some quotas and the liberalization of most
other import restrictions on 11 agricultural
products. Experts in the Library of Congress provide the following summary
analysis of available data:

u.s. exports of most of the negotiated GATT agricultural products have increased since the agreement was
signed in 1988. Some exports have increased significantly, while several have declined. Since the GATT11 agreement, the ketchup and tomato sauce category
increased the most dramatically, by 107 %. Other
category increases were much less significant, such as
sugars and syrups increasing by 16 % and fruits and
purees increasing by 34 %. The overall change in
U.S. exports of these 11 agricultural categories from
1988 to 1991 amount to a 10 % increase. U.S.
exports in the dried beans, peanuts, and pineapples
categories declined since 1988. (Nanto 1992, 14)
It is apparent that effective results were
gained with some notable exceptions.
Restrictions, however, remained on some
dairy products, despite the formal 1988
agreement, and negotiation to remove
these were ongoing as late as April of
1992 (Nanto 992, 14).
Similar results occurred in the case of
Super 301, where the original enactment
against Japan first aroused a refusal to
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negotiate according to the U. S. -determined
deadlines for concessions and retaliation;
the Japanese, however, agreed to at least
discuss their disagreements at the negotiating table, if the U. S. agreed to abandon
the Super 301 structure. Thus, although
altered from the original course, negotiations produced some progress.
Since that original period, a preliminary wood-product agreement was reached
in 1990 (JEN 1990, 10). Insufficient
subsequent market penetration, however,
spawned continued negotiation in 1991
(lEN 1991, 39) and in 1992 during the
Bush trade mission (When mouth 1992,
24). Thus, Super 301 lead to negotiations,
an agreement, and some initial penetration,
but that penetration failed to reach ideal
levels that the USTR negotiations had
targeted; arbitration continued and more
conclusive results are yet to be seen.
An agreement on supercomputers was
reached in March of 1990 which provided
for the opening up of eight major governmental contracts to bids from U.S. firms
(Connelly 1990, 1). Despite the agreement, however, bid-rigging in favor of
domestic firms reportedly continued and
was under investigation by the House
Government Operations National Security
subcommittee in July of 1992 (Robertson
1992, 6). Similar to GAIT-11 and to the
Super 301 wood-products scenarios, the
Super 301-induced supercomputer negotiations have produced some progress but
have failed to produce ideal levels of free
market access and export penetration.
The same type of pattern appears in the
Super 301 satellite sector. Whereas March
of 1990 brought the Japan Satellite Accord
Sales Pact with promised open competition
for U.S. satellite firms in Japan, April of
the same year saw controversy regarding a
Japanese government contract offered only
to a domestic firm. Only with threats of
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general trade retaliation did the Japanese
government agree to open the contract to
bids from u.S. firms (Jones 1991, 3).
In conclusion, it is difficult to discern
distinct differences in result when comparing the different forums for negotiation,
Super 301 and GATT. A similar pattern
of gained concession coupled with drawnout negotiation and conflict resolution
develops in either case. 1

Effects of Super 301 on GATT
Proponents of H.R. 5100 argue that
one benefit of Super 301 would be to
" ... get the Uruguay Round moving forward ... " (U.S. Congress. Housel992, 60).
Raymond Ahearn of the Library of Congress, however, points out the alternative
viewpoint that" ... Super 301 could torpedo
the GATT" (Ahearn 1990, 42). The likely
effect of a present-day Super 301 can be
analyzed by exploring the effect of the
1988 Super 301. In a special session of
GATT in June of 1989, over forty countries, including Finland, Canada, Mexico,
Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, Japan,
Israel, and the European Community made
statements condemning U.S. use of Super
301, claiming it violated the rules and
spirit of cooperative negotiation under
GATT. Although technical debate over
the statutes governing GATT has failed to
produce any definitive ruling on the legal
propriety of Super 301, the overwhelming
rejection of its unilateral tactics by members of GATT suggest at least a high
degree of hostility, though it may likewise
suggest the true pressure-creating capability of Super 301 which could force compromise in the GATT. This pressure,
though, has created what Raymond Ahearn
describes as ". . . suspicio[n] and in some
cases ... derision ... [from] many U.S.
trading partners" (Ahearn 1990, 25).
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Thus, it appears that Super 301 damages
the overall respectability and cooperative
influence of the United States, though it
may provide some leverage.
With regard to Japan's rice-import ban
specifically, Japanese officials have recognized that the desired successful completion of the Uruguay Round (which would
benefit Japan immensely with regard to
various aspects of the proposed agreement
-- for example, GATT regulation of intellectual property protection and the formulation of a Multilateral Trade Organization
designed to administer trade-dispute resolution) might require Japanese compromise
on the rice issue, thus Super 301 pressure
seems to be unneeded. However, it could
be alternatively argued that the positive
posturing of Japan with regard to rice
compromise in the round is a result of fear
of Super 301 action were the round to fail.
Thus, although it appears that Super 301
undermines the overall negotiating leadership position of the United States in
GATT, it is possible that at least the threat
of Super 301 might contribute some positive pressure for compromise.
Net Effects: Toward a Policy Recommendation
To recap, Super 301 could produce
some positive net effects on forces for
change with regard to rice in Japan. The
high-profile approach of Super 301 could
lead, through media coverage of the overall rice issue, to a heightened public
awareness of both Japan's reliance for
food security on healthy trade relations as
well as the costliness of the import ban.
Pro-rice market liberation elements within
the LDP could foster and utilize such
opportunities for media influence to create
a political atmosphere more open to
change despite the entrenched and unmov-
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ing agriculture lobby. Although it is
possible that the unilateral attack of Super
301 on rice, one of Japan's cultural icons,
could induce a public backlash, the last
Super 301 enactment in 1988 saw no such
negative reaction, and polling data indicate
no uniquely high levels of public resistance
to removal of the rice ban.
Super 301 would likely have no significant effect on security relations, based on
the indirect link of public opinion.
When comparing the 1988 Super 301
and GAIT efforts, a equivalent pattern of
qualified success coupled with frustration
and dragged-out negotiation develops.
That is to say, despite its ambitious, hardline approach, Super 301 appears to be no
more effective in terms of increased exports than GAIT. (When enough time
passes to reveal sufficient quantitative data
in the more recently settled Super 301
sectors, a more detailed comparison would
be helpful in testing this conclusion.)
Enactment of Super 301 in 1988
brought widespread protest against the
United States in GAIT, damaging the
United States' general position of respect
and leadership. (Here, as well, a more
detailed analysis of the negotiation dynamics of GAIT would be a helpful avenue of
further research.)
Furthermore, Super 301 represents an
undemocratic approach to international
conflict resolution. Super 301 benefits
with regard to forces for change must be
weighed against these costs. Additionally,
it must be taken into account that Japan
has expressed qualified support of riceliberalization provisions presently before
GAIT in the form of the Uruguay
Round's Dunkel proposal. This suggests
that a GAIT agreement on rice is attainable, and that if the 1988 GAIT-Super
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301 comparisons are accurate, such a
GAIT agreement would likely yield
roughly equivalent results as would a ricetargeted Super 301. Thus, even if Super
301 's unique net benefits in terms of effects on forces for change within Japan
were judged to rival the damaging costs to
the U.S.' overall democratic-international
leadership capability, enactment of Super
301 would be unnecessary. With the
comparative results in terms of exports
being basically equivalent, the broader
objectives of strengthening and sustaining
the United States' leadership of global
democratic efforts should take priority
over the possibility of affecting rice-related
forces internal to Japan.
It is arguable that at least the current
threat of a rice-targeted Super 301, however, has prompted Japan's willingness to
support the rice-liberalization negotiations
in GAIT. Thus, this threat should be
maintained, for example through highprofile activity and lobbying of pro-Super
301 elements of Congress, though these
efforts must not be allowed to lead to
enaCtment of Super 301.
IV. Conclusion
Although the secondary issue of ideology seems only to offer an abstract context
for discussion of Super 301, it provides, in
a way, the basis for the policy recommendation of this paper: that Japanese riceliberalization be sought through GAIT
rather than through Super 301. That is to
say, because GAIT seems to be no more
effective than unilateral actions such as
Super 301 in producing specific sector
export-expansion results, the ultimate
foundation of an argument against Super
301 rests on the assertion that democratic
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conflict-resolution is worth maintaining
and exemplifying in the global setting. A
comprehensive study of the philosophical
considerations as well as the broader quan

titative implications (beyond the narrow
context of increasing export penetration) of
this assertion constitute an important avenue for further research.
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NOTES
1. It should be noted that the Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) also began largely due to
pressure created by the enactment of Super 301 in 1988. The subject matter of these
negotiations, however, focused more on indirect barriers to trade within the Japanese
economy rather than more obvious governmental barriers which are the subject of this
comparison. Although noteworthy market-opening progress has been made under the SII
process, it is arguable that a similar pattern to Super 301 specific sector negotiations and
the GATT-ll has arisen: limited success coupled with failure and drawn out negotiation.

